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INTRODUCTION 
Defendants' Brief offers this Court a set of 
revisionist facts as a proposed foundation for Defendants' 
arguments. Many of Defendants' facts are irrelevant to the 
legal issues presented to the Court by this case; others are 
not supported by the Trial Court record. In the interest of 
space, Plaintiff directs the Court to its Brief for a general 
background of the salient and relevant facts to this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I . SCHOOL TRUST PRINCIPLES MERELY REQUIRE THE STATE 
TO COLLECT THE AGREED ROYALTY. 
I n t h e i r B r i e f , D e f e n d a n t s i n c r e d i b l y c o n t i n u e t o 
a r g u e t h a t " c o n s t i t u t i o n s , s t a t u t e s , a g r e e m e n t s and c o u r t 
imposed r u l e s a r e s u b o r d i n a t e t o " t h e s c h o o l t r u s t d o c t r i n e 
( B r i e f of D e f s . a t 1 3 ) . Tha t a rgument h a s a l r e a d y been 
r e j e c t e d by t h e Supreme Cour t i n t h i s c a s e and i s a g r o s s 
m i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e non-Utah s c h o o l t r u s t c a s e s upon 
which D e f e n d a n t s r e l y . 
1. Defendants make s p e c i f i c re fe rences to c e r t a i n monetary f igu res t h a t 
a re taken out of con tex t , are mischa rac t e r i zed or have l i t t l e to do 
with the i s s u e s . P l a i n t i f f notes the fol lowing as examples: (1) no 
evidence was adduced by Defendants t h a t the F e t t e r o l f Group rece ived 
any payment as an ove r r id ing r o y a l t y payment (Brief of Defs. a t 8 ) ; (2) 
no evidence was adduced by Defendants t h a t the F e t t e r o l f Group rece ived 
any compensation for assignment of the S ta t e Lease, I d . ; (3) no 
evidence was adduced by Defendants to show t h a t the proceeds from the 
s a l e of P l a i n t i f f ' s coal r ep r e sen t gross r e c e i p t s and not ne t p r o f i t s 
to P l a i n t i f f (Brief of Defs. a t 12); and (4) the S t a t e ' s r o y a l t y i s not 
c a l c u l a t e d aga in s t gross r e c e i p t s from a coal supply agreement but 
r a t h e r a g a i n s t the "value of the c o a l . " Id . 
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A. The Supreme Court Has Addressed This Issue. 
The "school trust doctrine" is nothing more than a 
combination of the State of Utah Enabling Act and general 
trust law. It is true that the Enabling Act imposes upon 
Defendants a trustee's duties to act in a fiduciary capacity 
for the school trust lands. Utah Enabling Act § 10, 2 8 Stat. 
109; Utah Const, art. XX, § 1. That duty, however, is only 
the same as the duty of private trustees. NPCA v. Board of 
State Lands, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah 1993). The State's 
duty was characterized by the Supreme Court in this case as 
follows: 
In administering the school trust lands, the 
state acts as trustee and its duties are the 
same as the duties of other trustees, 
[citations omitted] The state's duty of 
loyalty to the beneficiaries includes the 
duty not to act in the interest of a third 
party at the expense of the beneficiaries by 
disposing of that property for less than the 
agreed price. 
Plateau Mining Co. v. Division of State Lands, 502 P.2d 720, 
728-29 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to 
Defendants' claim that "full value" is determined by some 
mystical undertaking, "full value" is simply the contract 
price. 
B. Defendants Have Mischaracterized the School 
Trust Cases Upon Which They Rely. 
It is striking how Defendants' discussion of the 
school trust doctrine ignores the above-quoted language from 
Plateau and relies instead on numerous cases from other 
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jurisdictions. Those cases, of course, are not controlling 
because the scope of the school trust doctrine varies from 
state to state and is a product of the enabling legislation by 
which a state joins the Union and that state's constitution. 
See NPCA v. Board of State Lands, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32 n.3 
(Durham, J., concurring). Even if the cited foreign cases 
were controlling, the cases cited by Defendants do not stand 
for the principles cited. 
For example, State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 182 
P.2d 643 (Wash. 1947), does not support Defendants7 argument. 
In that case, the mineral lease clearly provided for payment 
of a 4% royalty on the sales value of the mineral after 
deduction of the costs of transportation and treatment. Id. 
The Commissioner decided to allow the lessee to also deduct 
its mining costs. The court held that the Commissioner could 
not add a deduction to the contract. Id. The court also 
noted, however, that "the Commissioner did have implied 
authority to make a reasonable administrative determination of 
the meaning of transportation and treatment," two terms whose 
meanings were ambiguous because they were not defined in the 
statute, regulations or lease. Id. 
Similarly, Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department, 
747 P.2d 1183 (Ariz. 1987) does not support Defendants' 
amorphous "full value" concept. The only issue in Kadish was 
whether Arizona could lease mineral lands without satisfying 
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the advertisement, public auction and appraisal procedures 
specifically imposed by the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act to 
assure full value. See, NPCA v. Board of State Lands, 215 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 32 (Durham, J., concurring). Kadish is 
simply irrelevant here. Id. 
Both Caffall Brothers Forest Products, Inc. v. 
Washington, 484 P.2d 912 (Wash. 1971), and Department of State 
Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985), are also 
misapplied by Defendants. Caffall involved a mutual error in 
a public competitive bidding process for the sale of timber on 
state school lands. The Caffall court held the sale 
transaction voidable because no enforceable contract existed 
under the statutory bidding process. Caffall, 484 P.2d at 
715-16. Again, there is no allegation in this case that the 
State Lease was erroneously or improperly issued. Caffall 
therefore does not apply. 
Pettibone addressed the issue of whether water rights 
vest in a state lessee or the state as owner of the leased 
school land. The court, noting that the state is charged with 
'"the same fiduciary duties applicable to private trustees,'" 
held that the water could not be alienated without adequate 
compensation. Pettibone, 702 P.2d at 954 (quoting Skamania 
County v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576, 58 (Wash. 1984)). In 
other words, the water, as an interest in school lands, could 
not be given away. Unlike Pettibone, this case does not 
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involve unauthorized alienation of State lands. It involves 
the interpretation of a fully authorized instrument granting 
the right to use state school lands. 
II. DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
VERSION OF THE FACTS BEING CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE WILL FAIL IN THE FACE OF A REVIEW OF 
THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT AND EXHIBITS. 
In its opening brief Plaintiff marshals the evidence 
that it introduced at trial to the extent possible within this 
Court's page limitations. That marshalling includes quotes of 
and cites to the record in accordance with this Court's rules. 
In response, Defendants' counter with their own version of the 
facts supported by quotes of the Trial Court's ruling instead 
of the evidence that supposedly would support that ruling. 
The fact that the Trial Court disregarded the 
evidence in this case could not be clearer in light of the 
court's comment at the beginning of the trial. At the 
beginning of the trial, the Defendants moved in limine to 
preclude the testimony of Charles Henderson (State Land Board 
Member in 1958) and Donald G. Prince (Division of Minerals 
employee for over 3 0 years), indeed, to preclude all evidence 
of the course of conduct between the state and all parties to 
state coal leases, regarding what the Royalty Clause had been 
intended to mean when the lease form was adopted in 1958. (R. 
1449-51.) Judge Bunnell concluded to allow the testimony but 
stated "We'll allow you [Defendants] to put that [evidence 
going to the intent of the drafting of the lease form] in, but 
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I agree with Mr. McKeachnie, I don't think that it has any 
relevance; but we'll allow it in, just, like I say, to give 
them [the appellate court] a complete record." (R. 1774.) In 
light of Judge Bunnell's admitted disregard of Prince's and 
Henderson's testimony this Court should carefully review the 
evidence marshalled by Plaintiff. Upon doing so it will find 
that the Trial Court's ruling regarding the meaning of the 
Royalty Clause is supported by the evidence. 
III. TRAIL MOUNTAIN HAD NO CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY TO 
THE STATE PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 17, 1981. 
A. Whether the Trail Mountain sublease is 
deemed to represent a "sublease" or an 
"assignment" is irrelevant because the 
Division's own rules require a formal 
approval process in order to shift 
liability for the payment of royalties from 
one party to another. 
Rule 13(b) of the State of Utah Rules and Regulations 
Governing the Issuance of Mineral Leases, which was in effect 
between 1979 and 1981, provided that "all assignments and 
subleases must be approved by the Board of State Lands or the 
Director; and no assignment or sublease will be effective 
until approval is given." (Exhibit 100.) (Emphasis added). 
The rule reflects the State's choice that the Division 
identify and contractually bind a single party responsible for 
obligations under a lease. That single lessee's obligations 
are secured by a performance bond in favor of the Division and 
the state. Utah Admin. R. 640-20-28(1), -(4)(1993). The 
bonding provisions secure compliance with the applicable terms 
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and provisions of the lease regardless of the then current 
lessee or operator. Id. R. 640-20-28(4)(b).2 
There was no conveyance of the State Lease to 
Plaintiff, whether by sublease or assignment, prior to 
January 26, 1981. At best, Plaintiff was, as recognized by 
the Division, the operator through whom Fetterolf operated the 
mine. (Exhibit 95.) Thus, there was no privity of estate 
between Plaintiff and the Division. Defendants concede that 
during the period prior to January 26, 1981, there was no 
privity of contract between Plaintiff and the Division. 
(Brief of Defs. at 8.) Without privity of estate or privity 
of contract, there is no legal basis for Defendants7 claim 
against Plaintiff for pre-January 26, 1981 royalties and that 
claim must be dismissed. 
B. Defendants stipulated that the Trail 
Mountain Sublease was a "sublease" for all 
purposes of the litigation. 
Paragraphs 12, 17, 21 and 55 of the Stipulated Facts 
in the April 11, 1988 Pretrial Order reference the August 13, 
1979 transaction as a sublease to Plaintiff. (R. 667-70, 
682.) Copies of the referenced pages of the Pretrial Order 
are attached hereto under Appendix A. By now arguing that the 
2. ''This bond shall be in effect even if the lessee or designated operator 
has conveyed all or part of the leasehold interest to a sublessee(s), 
assignee(s), or subsequent operator(s), until such time as the bond may-
be released by the state as lessor, . . . or until the bond is 
replaced with a new bond posted by a sublessee, assignee or new 
designated operator." Id. 
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Trail Mountain Sublease was actually an assignment, Defendants 
enthusiastically attempt to avoid the consequences of their 
own actions. The words "sublease" and "assignment" are legal 
terms of art and Defendants are represented by counsel. 
Whether Plaintiff is liable for pre-January 26, 1981 royalties 
was as much at issue in 1988 when the Pretrial Order was 
entered as it is now. It is disingenuous for Defendants to 
now claim they did not mean to stipulate that the Trail 
Mountain Sublease was in fact a sublease. 
C. The Trail Mountain Sublease was a 
"sublease." 
Plaintiff incurred a contractual obligation as a 
sublessee to the lessee, Fetterolf, to pay royalties. 
Defendants, without citing any authority, claim that 
Plaintiff's contractual obligation to Fetterolf somehow 
transforms Plaintiff into an assignee. There is no authority 
for that proposition and the argument is based on a 
misapprehension of the sublease/assignment distinction. The 
pivotal issue in distinguishing between a sublease and 
assignment is whether the transferor's entire estate passes 
under the instrument. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 
P.2d 107, 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). It is indisputable that 
the Trail Mountain Sublease was not for the entire term of the 
State Lease.3 The Division, like any other lessor, must turn 
3. By its terms, the Sublease remained in effect only until "all of the 
coal in the premises is mined to exhaustion." By contrast, by the 
clear terms of the State Lease, it remains in effect even after the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-8-
to its lessee, particularly in this circumstance, where it has 
chosen by its own regulations to make that its exclusive 
remedy. Whether the lessee may then seek indemnification from 
the sublessee is another matter that is not at issue in this 
case. 
IV. DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS FOR ROYALTIES ALLEGEDLY 
ACCRUING PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 27, 1987, ARE BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The issue in this case is not, as Defendants 
misapprehend, whether a statute of limitations runs against 
school lands in such a manner to allow one in wrongful 
possession of school lands to divest the State of title to 
those lands. The issue in this case is whether the State, 
once it has put a party in rightful possession of school lands 
through a written instrument, can enforce the terms of that 
written instrument beyond the period of limitation. 
Defendants place substantial reliance on Van Wagoner 
v. Whitemore, 58 Utah 418, 199 P. 670 (1921). Van Wagoner, 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
coal is mined so long as annual rentals and minimum royalties are paid. 
(Exhibit 1.) The State Lease provides that its term is from the 
commencement date "and as long thereafter as said minerals may be 
produced in commercial quantities from said lands or lessee shall 
continue to make the payments required by Article III hereof." Id. 
(emphasis added). Article III requires the payment of rent and annual 
minimum royalty when the lease is not in production. Id. The State 
clearly understands that the term of the State Lease continues even 
after production ceases as long as rental and delay royalties are paid. 
Indeed, the State has insisted that coal operators continue to pay 
rentals and delay royalties after the coal is mined. (R. 664.) 
Therefore, the Sublease was a transfer for less than the whole lease 
term and is indisputably a sublease. 
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however, stands only for the unremarkable proposi t ion t ha t the 
State cannot be divested of t i t l e to school lands by adverse 
pos se s s ion / In t h i s case, the r i gh t to ex t rac t coal was 
granted in accordance with law by v i r tue of the Div is ion ' s 
issuance of the State Lease, which i s merely a wr i t t en 
cont rac t . Under the State4Lease, the lessee and i t s agents 
had the r i gh t to remove coal and once removed, t ha t coal 
became the personal property of the l essee . Benton v. 
Division of State Lands & Forestry f 709 P.2d 362, 366 (Utah 
1985). There i s no claim here tha t the lessee under the Sta te 
Lease adversely possessed the State lands by removing coal . 
Under the terms of the State Lease, the lessee had a 
contrac tual obl igat ion to pay the Sta te a royal ty on coal 
produced and sold from the mine.5 I t i s merely t h a t 
cont rac tua l r i gh t to receive r o y a l t i e s t ha t Defendants are 
attempting to enforce in t h i s ac t ion . As discussed in 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Brief, t h i s act ion on a contract i s governed by 
4. The Van Wagoner cour t narrowly framed the "overshadowing ques t ion" of 
the case as fo l lows: " [ a ] r e the lands in cont roversy sub j ec t to the 
s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s r e l i e d on by a p p e l l a n t s [ the adverse possess ion 
s t a t u t e s ] and can t i t l e t h e r e t o be acqui red by adverse pos se s s ion?" 
Id . a t 422, 199 P. a t 671 (emphasis added) . 
5. In f a c t , Defendants ' claim a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f for the r o y a l t i e s on 
coal so ld p r i o r to January 26, 1981, does not even a r i s e from the 
S t a t e Lease because , as expla ined above, P l a i n t i f f was not in 
p r i v i t y of c o n t r a c t or p r i v i t y of e s t a t e with the Div i s ion with 
r e s p e c t to the S t a t e Lease p r i o r to January 26, 1981. Although 
P l a i n t i f f d i s p u t e s t h a t Defendants could d i r e c t l y enforce 
P l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n to F e t t e r o l f . Even i f i t 
could, the a c t i o n to enforce the Sublease would i n d i s p u t a b l y be 
an a c t i o n on a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t sub jec t to s e c t i o n 78-12-23. 
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the six year period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 
(1992), which is expressly applicable to the State. Id. 
§ 78-12-23 (2) . 
Defendants also retreat to the law of adverse 
possession in their attempt to avoid Plaintiff's statute of 
limitations argument by claiming that the seven year 
limitation period of section 78-12-2 applies. The Supreme 
Court has narrowly framed section 78-12-2 as "in substance 
[providing] that the State is barred from bringing an action 
for the recovery of real property claimed by it," but that is 
wrongfully possessed by another. See Pioneer Investment & 
Trust Co. v. Board of Educ.. 35 Utah 1, 99 P. 150, 152 (1908). 
This case does not involve a situation where the State has 
been wrongfully deprived of possession of real property and 
profits therefrom during a period of adverse use. This case 
involves rightful possession of property and the State's 
contractual right to receive a royalty upon the sale of 
Plaintiff's personal property. 
Even if section 78-12-2 were to apply in this case, 
Plaintiff would be entitled to judgment with respect to 
royalties due prior to February 21, 1980 because Defendants 
have not disputed that they did not commence their action for 
royalty deficiencies until February 21, 1987. 
Defendants further assert that the statute of 
limitations has not run in this case because the royalty 
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payments owed by Plaintiff to the State constitute an open, 
current and mutual account, and statutes of limitation do not 
start to run until final payment. Even a cursory review of 
the applicable law reveals the futility of Defendants' 
argument. Section 78-12-32 specifically addresses limitation 
of actions on open accounts: 
In action brought to recover a balance 
due upon a mutual, open and current 
account, where there have been 
reciprocal demands between the parties, 
the cause of action shall be deemed to 
have accrued from the time of the last 
item proved on the account of either 
side. 
Id. (emphasis added). In this case, there are no "reciprocal 
demands," but rather a unilateral demand by Defendants that 
the additional royalties allegedly accruing at the end of each 
quarter during the audit period be paid. Under the 
circumstances of this case, the statute of limitations ran 
from the end of each quarter for royalties allegedly accruing 
during that quarter. See Van de Wiele v. Koch, 472 P.2d 803 
(Or. 1970) (involving statute of limitations on grocery store 
account which ran from end of each month on purchases made 
during that month). The requirement to pay a series of 
royalty payments would not constitute an open account. See 
Bishop v. Parker, 103 Utah 145, 134 P.2d 180 (1943).6 
6. Wortman v. Sun Oil Co.. 690 P.2d 385 (1984), the only "open 
account" case cited by Defendants, does not support Defendants' 
position. Indeed, Wortman held that the transactions between an 
oil company and royalty owners pertaining to interest on a 
suspended royalty payment was not a "mutual, open, running 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-12-
V. THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
A. Interest is not collectible in this Case. 
Utah law clearly prohibits imposition of prejudgment 
interest in this case and Defendants have not cited any 
controlling precedent to the contrary. Canyon Country Store 
v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989); Price-Orem v. Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnel1, 748 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Chevron 
Chem. Co. v. Mecham, 536 F. Supp. 1036 (D. Utah 1982). The 
Atlantic Richfield case cited by Defendants is not on point in 
this case because in the Atlantic Richfield case there was no 
ambiguity regarding how to allocate the royalty. 21 I.B.L.A. 
98 (1975). In this case, the Trial Court found the State 
Lease both "ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations," 
and required a trial to resolve those ambiguities (R. 1675), 
and yet somehow sufficiently clear to allow calculation of 
damages before trial with mathematical accuracy. There is no 
argument that can support the court's inherently inconsistent 
position. 
B. If collectible, interest would be limited 
to six percent. 
The Supreme Court clearly rejected an argument 
identical to Defendants' in SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
account" such that subsequent royalty payments would save the 
royalty owners' claim from the running of a three-year statute of 
limitations with respect to implied contracts. Id. at 390-91. 
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732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986). In SCM Land, the p l a i n t i f f and the 
defendant had entered into a lease in 1979, while the 
s t a tu to ry r a t e of i n t e r e s t was s ix percent . The lease was 
s i l e n t with respect to i n t e r e s t on unpaid ob l iga t ions . The 
Tr ia l Court assessed s t a tu to ry i n t e r e s t a t the r a t e of ten 
percent on the damages tha t accrued a f te r May 14, 1981, the 
ef fec t ive date of an amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 
(1953) r a i s ing the legal r a t e to ten percent . The Supreme 
Court, noting tha t sect ion 15-1-1 spec i f i ca l ly s t a t e s tha t i t 
does not apply to "any contract or obl igat ion made before the 
14th day of May 1981," reversed the t r i a l court and held t ha t 
s ix percent was the r a t e appl icable to obl iga t ions under the 
con t rac t . SCM Land, 732 P.2d a t 108-109. 
The State Lease, which was entered in to before May 
14, 1981, does not expressly e s t ab l i sh an i n t e r e s t r a t e for 
unpaid ob l iga t ions . Therefore, under Utah law, even if 
prejudgment i n t e r e s t could be awarded in t h i s case, i t could 
only be awarded a t the r a t e of s ix percent because t h i s r a t e 
became a contrac t term by operation of law. 
7. In a va in a t tempt to avoid the SCM Land ho ld ing and charge the ten 
pe rcen t i n t e r e s t r a t e t h a t became e f f e c t i v e on May 14, 1981, 
Defendants r e l y on the fol lowing language of the S t a t e Lease: 
This l ea se i s granted sub jec t in a l l r e s p e c t s 
to and under the cond i t ions of the laws of the 
S t a t e of Utah and e x i s t i n g r u l e s and 
r e g u l a t i o n s and such ope ra t i ng r u l e s and 
r e g u l a t i o n s as may be h e r e a f t e r approved and 
adopted by the S t a t e Land Board. (Exhib i t 1.) 
By i t s express terms, however, s e c t i o n 15-1-1 s t a t e s t h a t i t does not 
Footnote cont inued on next page. 
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C. The Division may not apply the interest 
rates established in its own rules. 
The Board's attempted increase of the interest rate 
clearly impaired the State Lease by tripling the rate of 
interest due on unpaid royalties in violation of the Contracts 
Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const, art. I, 
§ 10. This impairment is analogous to the impairment the 
Supreme Court found in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 
431 U.S. 1 (1977).8 The reasoning of United States Trust 
applies in full force to this case. Under the United States 
Trust court's Contracts Clause analysis, states may not 
legislatively increase their financial benefits or decrease 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
apply to contracts entered into before May 14, 1981. Therefore, even 
if that provision incorporated the 1981 amendment to section 15-1-1 
into the State Lease, which it does not, that provision would not 
entitle Defendants to charge interest at the rate of ten percent. 
8, In United States Trust the Court rejected New Jersey's attempt to 
invalidate its contractual obligation, stating: 
In applying this standard, however, complete 
deference to a legislative assessment of 
reasonableness and necessity is not 
appropriate because the State's self-interest 
is at stake. A governmental entity can always 
find a use for extra money, especially when 
taxes do not have to be raised. If a State 
could reduce its financial obligations 
whenever it wanted to spend money for whatever 
it regarded as an important public purpose, 
the Contract Clause would provide no 
protection at all. 
United States Trust. 431 U.S. at 25-26. 
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their financial burdens solely for the sake of generating 
revenue. Id. at 2 5-2 6. 
D. The Board does not have the au thor i ty to 
impose i t s own higher r a t e s . 
Defendants' r e l i ance on Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-23 
(1986) as the source of the Board's au thor i ty to u n i l a t e r a l l y 
r a i s e i n t e r e s t r a t e s i s misplaced. Administrative agencies, 
such as the Board, possess only such rulemaking au thor i ty as 
the l e g i s l a t u r e expressly delegates to them. Accordingly, as 
a general r u l e , the l e g i s l a t u r e cannot delegate to an 
adminis t ra t ive agency the author i ty to amend or subvert a 
s t a t u t e . See Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. 
Welch, 446 P.2d 268 (Okla. 1968). The Utah Supreme Court 
a r t i c u l a t e d t h i s p r inc ip le as follows: " ru les and regula t ions 
of an adminis t ra t ive agency must conform to ra the r than be 
contrary to and incons is tent with s t a tu to ry law." McKnight v. 
State Land Bd.. 381 P.2d 726, 730 (Utah 1983).9 
9. Defendants apparen t ly p lace r e l i a n c e on the genera l language of s e c t i o n 
65-1-23 to support the Board 's u n i l a t e r a l i nc rease of i n t e r e s t r a t e s . 
Well e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , however, p r o h i b i t a p p l i c a t i o n 
of t h i s s e c t i o n in a manner t h a t would s anc t ion the Board ' s r u l e s . 
Even assuming s e c t i o n 65-1-23 could be app l i ed to i n t e r e s t r a t e s , the 
Court should subord ina te the genera l language of those s e c t i o n s to the 
s p e c i f i c language of s e c t i o n 15 -1 -1 , which e s t a b l i s h e s a l e g a l r a t e of 
i n t e r e s t on c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s in the absence of an express 
agreement among the p a r t i e s . See Floyd v. Western Surg ica l Assoc . . 
I n c . . 773 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Such a c o n s t r u c t i o n i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y app rop r i a t e with r e s pec t to s e c t i o n 65-1-23 , which 
con ta ins the express l i m i t a t i o n "except as o therwise provided by law," 
because in t h i s case the i n t e r e s t r a t e i s "o therwise provided" by 
s e c t i o n 1 5 - 1 - 1 . 
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In the lone s t a t u t e in which the l e g i s l a t u r e 
authorized the Board to se t i n t e r e s t r a t e s ( re la t ing to the 
method of payment for sa les of s t a t e lands) , i t spec i f i ca l ly 
so s ta ted- Utah Code Ann- § 65-1-37 (1986)(repealed 1993). 
Nothing c i ted by Defendants gives the Board s imilar author i ty 
with respect to s e t t i ng i n t e r e s t r a t e s on delinquent 
r o y a l t i e s . Where the l eg i s l a t u r e expressly addresses an issue 
in one context and f a i l s to address i t in another, the court 
must give effect to the omission in the l a t e r context and 
presume the l e g i s l a t u r e intended the omission. See Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973). 
Because the l e g i s l a t u r e expressly authorized the Board to se t 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s on unpaid debts under cont rac ts for the sa le of 
s t a t e lands but fa i led to bestow similar author i ty with 
respect to unpaid lease obl iga t ions , the Court should conclude 
tha t the Board had no author i ty to rewri te leases by changing 
i n t e r e s t r a t es . 1 0 
10. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t p r i o r to 1971, not even s e c t i o n 65-1-37 
au thor i zed the Board to s e t i t s own i n t e r e s t r a t e for payments on s t a t e 
l ands . Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-31 (1953). The Court should presume t h a t 
the l e g i s l a t u r e did not perform an unnecessary ac t when I t enacted a 
s t a t u t e and t h a t i t intended to change e x i s t i n g law. Madsen v. 
Bor th ick , 769 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah 1988); Wetering v. E i s e l e . 682 P.2d 
1055, 1061 (Wyo. 1984). Utah Code Ann. s e c t i o n s 65-1-23 and 65-1-97 
(1953) e x i s t e d p r i o r to 1971. I f s e c t i o n s 65-1-23 and 65-1-97 gave the 
Board a u t h o r i t y to s e t i t s own i n t e r e s t r a t e s as Defendants contend, 
the amendment to s e c t i o n 65-1-37 express ly a u t h o r i z i n g the Board to s e t 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s for purchase payments on s t a t e lands would have been 
unnecessary . Therefore , t h i s Court should conclude t h a t s e c t i o n s 
65-1-23 and 65-1-97 do not au thor i ze the Board by r u l e to u n i l a t e r a l l y 
change the i n t e r e s t r a t e s on i t s e x i s t i n g l e a s e s . 
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E. The State Lease does not require payment of 
a "market rate" royalty. 
Finally, Defendants argue by reference to a whole 
chart of facts not in evidence (i.e., State Treasurer's 
Investment Pool statistics, Internal Revenue Service rates and 
Prime Lending rates) that any interest rate for delinquent 
payments under the State Lease below "market rates" is 
unconstitutional. (Brief of Defs. at 41-43.) Defendants7 new 
theory, however, was never raised at trial, is not supported 
by evidence adduced, and is not based on the State Lease form, 
a statute or case law. Moreover, Defendants' argument 
undermines its claim that it is necessary for Defendants to 
collect 18% interest to recover "full value" because the 
interest rates cited by Defendants are much lower than 18%, 
and as this court knows, are now even lower than the 6% rate 
Defendants are trying to avoid. 
VI. TRANSPORTATION COSTS ARE DEDUCTIBLE. 
A. There is no evidence in the record that 
supports a finding that Plaintiff never 
gave Defendants its transportation cost 
information. 
The three state auditors that reviewed Plaintiff's 
records did not even disclose that they were assessing 
royalties under the federal scheme. (R. 1809-10.) By keeping 
the purpose of Plaintiff's audit a secret, Defendants deprived 
Plaintiff of an opportunity to request that transportation 
costs be considered during the audit. (R. 2051-52.) The 
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auditors asked only for gross sales value, not understanding 
the federal scheme that allows the transportation deduction. 
(R. 1789, 1799, 1940-41, 2043.) Plaintiff's transportation 
costs were set forth in the same reports as its tonnage and 
gross sales value figures, which were provided to the State's 
auditors in 1987. (R. 2330-2472.) Those reports were 
available to Defendants, but were ignored because Defendants 
believed that a lessee was not entitled to such a deduction. 
The Trial Court ruled and Defendants have not disputed on 
appeal that Defendants, not Plaintiff, had the burden of 
establishing "what the royalty rate was, and the amount owed, 
if any, by Plaintiff." (R. 1068.) Defendants' election to 
now reject the deduction even though they had the benefit of 
the figures necessary for the calculation should not result in 
a bar to Plaintiff's claim for the deduction. 
B. Transportation costs do not constitute 
value of coal for purposes of calculating 
royalty. 
Defendants hopelessly misunderstand the nature of 
coal sales agreements and therefore erroneously allege that 
Plaintiff "received credit" for transportation costs from the 
purchasers of Plaintiff's coal in such a manner that Plaintiff 
would benefit from a "double deduction." Plaintiff's coal 
sales agreements contain pricing provisions typical to the 
coal industry that provide a "base price" representing the sum 
of identified components (labor, taxes, equipment, 
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depreciation, transportation, quality, insurance, etc.) and a 
adjustment mechanism to reflect changes in the individual 
components. (Exhibits 97, 98.) Certain of the components, 
such as transportation, represent a "service" to the 
purchaser, the cost of which must be added to the value of the 
coal as compensation for the service. Service components in 
the pricing mechanism represent reimbursement, not profit, to 
the supplier. The federal royalty scheme recognizes this by 
allowing a coal supplier to "backout" transportation costs 
from the contract price for purposes of calculating a "value" 
for royalty purposes. This "backout" or "deduction" is merely 
an accounting step to recognize the actual proceeds received 
under a coal supply agreement that represent the value of the 
coal. Plaintiff seeks nothing more from Defendants than 
recognition of this accounting procedure, without which 
Plaintiff will be required to pay a royalty on reimbursement 
proceeds attributable to trucking the coal to a point for 
distribution by railroad. Plaintiff's request takes no money 
from "Utah's school children" because the costs of trucking 
the coal is not a part of the "value" of the trust's coal. 
C. Defendants misstate the facts upon which 
they rely. 
Defendants' interpretation of both state and federal 
law applicable to this issue is misleading and relies on 
incorrect facts. 
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(1) "The sales price is the fairest indication 
of value and a percentage rate allows the royalty to fluctuate 
with changing market conditions." (Brief of Defs. at 45.) 
The "sales price" for coal is the price received for each ton 
of coal by Plaintiff under its coal supply agreements. 
However, as explained above, the so-called "sales price" is 
made up of value and service components, the later of which 
does not constitute a fair indication of value and should not 
bear a royalty burden. 
(2) "The State coal lease form, by adopting the 
prevailing federal rate, does not adopt the federal method of 
calculating royalties." Id. This is a classic example of how 
Defendants have tried to "have their cake and eat it too." If 
the State is entitled to the benefits of the federal rate, 
then the State is also bound by the limitations on the federal 
rate. The federal regulations impose a royalty of "eight 
percent of the value of the coal removed from a underground 
mine." 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2 (1992). Eight percent is a 
number. It is not a rate. The rate is that number times the 
"value of the coal removed." Id. The State Lease expressly 
adopts the federal method. The Trial Court specifically made 
this finding. (R. at 2738-39.) "The prevailing federal rate 
during the audit period was eight percent of the value of the 
coal produced by the Plaintiff." ((R. at 2739)(emphasis 
added)). As described, "value of the coal" was determined by 
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deducting, among other "service components," the 
transportation costs from the contract price. 
(3) "Plaintiff does not claim however, that it 
actually received or took such a deduction on its federal 
leases." (Brief of Defs. at 45.) Plaintiff presented 
unchallenged evidence at trial that it did in fact make such 
an adjustment for federal royalty purposes. (R. 1976.) 
(4) "It is therefore possible that transporta-
tion costs were also backed out of the values used to 
determine the royalty owed to the State." (Brief of Defs. at 
4 6.) Unimpeached testimony by two witnesses demonstrates that 
this is not true. (R. 1940-42, 1963-64.) 
D. Plaintiff was not required to make an 
application for a transportation allowance. 
Defendants attempt to perpetuate the Trial Court's 
erroneous conclusion that an allowance must be applied for and 
granted before transportation costs can be deducted in the 
calculation of value. The evidence at trial was 
uncontradicted that the federal coal valuation regulations 
promulgated in 1987 specifically identifying transportation 
costs as a component of value were "a continuation of 
longstanding MMS policy; however, there has never been 
explicit guidance or regulation pertaining to coal 
transportation allowances." 52 Fed. Reg. 1840, 1846 (1987) 
(attached as Appendix B); (R. 2168). Defendants' own witness, 
Max Nielson of the BLM, also testified that it was long-
-22-
standing BLM policy to allow an automatic deduction of the 
costs of transporting coal to a remote point of sale in 
ascertaining value for royalty purposes, (R. 1841-42.) 
Defendants' argument that the MMS historically never 
allowed a deduction for transportation is an attempt at 
drafting legerdemain. The 1987 regulations clearly 
acknowledge the past MMS "long-standing" policy to allow 
deducting transportation costs under coal valuation procedures 
and adopt a new scheme whereby prospective application is 
required for such allowance. 52 Fed. Reg. 1840, 1846 (1987). 
Copies of the referenced pages of the Proposed Rulemaking are 
attached hereto under Appendix B. Defendants7 flagship case, 
Coastal States Energy Company, No. MMS-86-0149-MIN (Interior 
Dec. May 1, 1987), a Minerals Management Service opinion, was 
issued under the pre-1987 system that automatically allowed 
deductions from the gross value of the coal which were 
expended to prepare the coal for sale. 30 C.F.R. 
§ 203.200(f), (h) (1989). If audited, the lessee was required 
to provide an accurate account of the deducted costs. Id. 
The application and preapproval requirements did not 
exist during the audit period of the State Lease. Therefore, 
the MMS "longstanding" policy of allowing an automatic 
deduction for transportation costs was applicable to 
Plaintiff's coal operations during the audit period. The 
policy did not require an application to the MMS to allow the 
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deduction. The regulations are clear on this point and 
Plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the regulations strains 
even the most liberal reading of the regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Trial Court imposing an eight 
percent royalty upon Plaintiff's coal production from the 
State Lease for the full audit period should be reversed. 
This Court should find that Plaintiff is obligated to pay only 
those royalties at the rate and pursuant to the mechanism 
supported by the true administrative interpretation of the 
State Lease. In addition, the Court should hold that 
Plaintiff's royalty obligation is subject to applicable law 
which allows a deduction for transportation costs, the 
imposition of statutes of limitation and the applicability of 
the State's rules imposing liability on only approved 
assignees and does not allow application of prejudgment 
interest. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W i l l f t N i B j Pr i f t&TT2653 
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JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Trail Mountain 
Coal Company 
-24-
APPENDIX A 
Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682) 
Richard B. Johns (USB #1706) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
FILED 
JUDICIAL or 
• • - - i i : <::: 
IN ;HE SEvrfrH JUDICIAL oiv r c ::•'>; 
OF UTAH 'N AND F0P PM«' : ' 
33UCEC PUN'<, C.erk 
.Cecut; 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION 
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; 
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE 
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF 
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
Civil No. 4847 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
This matter was heard at 1:30 p.m. on October 26, 
1987, before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell pursuant to Rule 16 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 5.1 of thepRulqis erf 
Practice in the District and Circuit Courts of the State^ ofi" 
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(c) Sublease 
12. On August 13, 1979, Myron F. Fetterolf 
subleased the State Coal Lease to Trail Mountain Coal Company, 
a Utah corporation. The sublease was not reduced to writing 
until January 26, 1981. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 20. Trail 
Mountain Coal Company was owned by the Fetterolf Group, Inc., a 
Pennsylvania corporation (80%), John L. Bell (18%) and Charles 
A. Bass (2%). See Page 24 of Plaintiffs Exhibit 15. 
13. The State of Utah Rules and Regulations 
Governing the Issuance of Mineral Leases as promulgated by the 
Board of State Lands and Forestry provide in part: 
R632-20-22. Lease Provisions 
* * * 
5. Assignments, Subleases and 
Overriding Royalties. 
* * * 
(b) Any mineral lease may be assigned 
or subleased as to all or part of the 
acreage, to any person, firm, 
association or corporation qualified to 
hold a state lease, provided, however, 
that all assignments and subleases are 
approved by the board or by the 
division; and no assignment or sublease 
is effective until approval is given. 
Any assignment or sublease made without 
such approval is void ab initio. 
Recorded in Judgment Record 
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BRUCE C. FUNK, Clerk 
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See Utah Administrative Code, Rule 632-20-22 (1987); formerly 
Rule 13 of Board of State Lands and Forestry. 
14. Neither the Board nor the Division approved 
the sublease of the State Coal Lease from Myron F. Fetterolf to 
Trail Mountain Coal Company. Neither Myron F. Fetterolf nor 
Trail Mountain Coal Company notified the Board or the Division 
of the existence of the sublease. However, Mr. Fetterolf did 
list Trail Mountain Coal Company as the operator of the Trail 
Mountain Mine in a letter to the Division dated August 20, 
1979. See Defendants' Exhibit 1. 
15. In mid-1979, David R. Mills, Mining Engineer 
for the Fetterolf Group, notified the Division that Trail 
Mountain Coal Company intended to begin mining coal from the 
land covered by the State Coal Lease. The State acknowledged 
this notice by two letters dated June 21, 1979 and July 18, 
1979. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 8 and 10. 
16. In order to reach the coal in the land 
covered by the State Coal Lease, Trail Mountain Coal Company 
mined coal in adjacent land covered by Federal Coal Lease 
U-082996, which was also part of the Trail Mountain Mine. This 
mining activity on Federal Coal Lease U-082996 occurred during 
the period from December, 1978 through September, 1979. A 
royalty of 15flf per ton was paid on this federal coal. 
Recorded in JudgmenLffccard 
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17. During the period from July, 1979 through 
January 26, 1981, coal was mined from the State Coal Lease 
Property by Myron F. Fetterolf, through his sublessee, Trail 
Mountain Coal Company. A royalty of 15^ per ton was paid on 
this State coal. 
18. During 1980, the Division notified Myron F. 
Fetterolf that the Trail Mountain Mine was in violation of 
certain laws. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 12, 13 and 14. 
(d) Sale of Trail Mountain Coal Company 
19. In January of 1981, the owners of Trail 
Mountain Coal Company (the "Company") sold the Company to 
Natomas Minerals of Utah, Inc. The transaction involved the 
following steps. 
(1) On January 8, 1981, the Fetterolf Group, 
Inc., John L. Bell and Charles A. Bass sold their 
stock in Trail Mountain Coal Company to Natomas 
Minerals of Utah, Inc. and Natomas Trail Mountain Coal 
Company. The sale of stock was effective March 2, 
1981. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 15, 20 and 21. 
(2) The stock acquired by Natomas Trail Mountain 
Coal Company was retired, and Natomas Minerals of 
Utah, Inc. thereby became the sole shareholder of 
Trail Mountain Coal Company. 
Recorded in Judgment Record 
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(e) Assignment of State Coal Lease 
20. As part of the above sale, the Estate of 
Myron F. Fetterolf assigned the leasehold interest under the 
State Coal Lease, to Trail Mountain Coal Company. See 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 15, 20 and 21. This assignment was 
executed on January 26, 1981, and was approved by the Director 
of the Division on February 17, 1981. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 16 and 18. The Director was not aware of any 
deficiency, and did not notify Trail Mountain Coal Company of 
any deficiency in royalty payments at the time the assignment 
was approved. 
21. Due to the assignment of the State Coal 
Lease to Trail Mountain Coal Company, the Company's interest 
under the sublease merged with its interest as lessee under the 
State Coal Lease. 
22. Trail Mountain Coal Company subsequently 
merged into Natomas Minerals of Utah, Inc., which subsequently 
merged into W.K. Minerals, Inc. The State's coal lease records 
have not been revised to reflect these mergers. The records 
therefore still indicate that Trail Mountain Coal Company is 
the lessee under the State Coal Lease. In fact, W.K. Minerals, 
Inc. is the actual lessee and is the proper plaintiff in this 
case, but W.K. Minerals, Inc. has continued to do business as 
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54• The Royalty Audit Report also concluded that 
$1/854,115.69 in interest had accrued on the unpaid royalties, 
and that a penalty of $16,606,76 was to be assessed. The total 
amount due was set at $5,222,197.20. The Director requested 
payment of this amount from Trail Mountain Coal Company. See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 64. 
55. The alleged royalty underpayments for the 
years 1979 and 1980 relate to a period of operation prior to 
the assignment of the State Coal Lease to Trail Mountain Coal 
Company. 
(j) Interest and Penalty Calculations. 
56. The Royalty Audit Report includes a charge 
for accrued interest on the amount the State claims to be 
owing. The State's demand for accrued interest is based upon 
the statutory rate of interest of 6% for the period from 
November 1, 1979 to June 30, 1981; upon the statutory rate of 
interest of 10% for the period from July 1, 1981 to 
November 30, 1982; and upon a regulation adopted by the Board 
of State Lands in November of 1982 purportedly imposing an 18% 
interest rate for the period from December 1, 1982 to 
October 15, 1985. There is also a penalty of 6% claimed as 
provided by a rule of the Division of State Lands promulgated 
in December, 1983. 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
Minerals Management Service 
Bureau of Land Management 
AGENCY: Minerals Management Service (MMS), Interior. 
30 CFR Parts 202, 203, 206, 212, and 218 
43 CFR Part 3480 
Revision of Coal Product Valuation Regulations and Related 
Topics 
52 FR 1840 
January 15, 198 7 
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 
SUMMARY: This proposed rulemaking provides for the amendment and clarification 
of regulations governing the valuation of coal for royalty purposes. The 
regulations being amended affect Federal coal leases and Indian (Tribal and 
allotted) coal leases (except leases on the Osage Indian Reservation, Osage 
County, Oklahoma). 
In addition, the proposed rule establishes definitions related to the 
valuation of coal covered in Subpart F of Part 206. 
The purpose of this rulemaking is to update, consolidate, and clarify 
existing regulations in order to provide industry and the public with a 
comprehensive and consistent coal valuation policy. 
DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before April 15, 1987. The hearing is 
scheduled to be held on: March 3, 1987, 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., in Denver, 
Colorado. 
ADDRESSES: Written comments may be mailed to Minerals Management Service, 
Royalty Management Program, Rules and Procedures Branch, Denver Federal Center, 
Building 85, P.O. Box 25165, Mail Stop 660, Denver, Colorado 80225, Attention: 
Dennis C. Whitcomb. 
The hearings will be held at the following location: Denver -- Sheraton 
Airport Hotel, 353 5 Quebec Street, Denver, Colorado. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT-.Dennis C. Whitcomb (303) 231-3432, (FTS) 
326-3432. 
TEXT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The principal authors of this proposed rule 
are Earl Cox, Herbert B. Wincentsen, Thomas J. Blair, Stanley J. Brown, and 
William H. Feldmiller, of the Royalty Valuation and Standards Division of the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) Lakewood, Colorado; and Peter J. Schaumberg of 
the Office of the Solicitor, Washington, DC. 
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are net of washing allowances. 
Paragraph (d) would specify the adjustment procedure when actual allowances 
are different from the estimates. If the lessee overestimated costs, the lessee 
would be required to pay the additional royalty plus interest, For 
underestimates, lessees would be allowed a credit without interest. The actual 
procedures to adjust Form MMS-4 014 will be included in the MMS Payor Handbook. 
Paragraph (e) is proposed to allow the use of the same administrative or 
computation procedures contained in § 206.260 to determine other washing costs 
when valuing coal under a net-back procedure or other valuation procedure 
contained in Subpart F of Part 206. 
Proposed § 206.261, Allocation of washed coal, is applicable to both 
cents-per-ton leases and ad valorem leases which produce coal that is subjected 
to washing. This proposed section instructs lessees on procedures of how to 
properly allocate washed coal tonnages back to the leases from which the coal 
was originally produced. The proper allocation of washed coal is essential to 
the proper reporting and paying of royalties. 
Proposed § 206.262, Transportation allowances, would grant an allowance to 
lessees when it is necessary to transport coal from the lease or mine to a wash 
plant remote from the lease or mine or to a point of sale remote from the lease 
or mine. The proposed regulation is a continuation of long-standing MMS 
policy; however, there has never been explicit guidance or regulation pertaining 
to coal transportation allowances. MMS has received several inquiries in the 
past questioning what conditions must be present in order to obtain approval to 
deduct a transportation allowance. The following explanation is not intended to 
be conclusive or exhaustive but is intended to convey the general criteria MMS 
would apply to determine whether a transportation allowance is warranted. First, 
transportation to a point of sale on the lease or on the mine property or to a 
point of sale in the vicinity of, or adjacent to the leases or mine, does not 
qualify for transportation allowances. Second, if the transportation is part of 
what MMS considers normal mine operation, then no transportation costs are 
allowed. Normal mine operation is considered to include transportation on or 
about the mine. This includes transportation in the pit, from the pit(s) to the 
load-out silos or tipples, or to crushers or other coal preparation facilities 
including wash plants located on or near the mine. 
A lessee would be entitled to a transportation allowance only if the value 
for the coal has been determined pursuant to § 206.259 at a point remote from 
the lease or mine. Thus, for example, if value has been determined based upon 
spot prices for coal at the mine, the lessee would not be entitled to a further 
deduction from that value. A transportation allowance would be allowed, however, 
in those circumstances where value is determined based upon the gross proceeds 
for the sale of coal at a sales point remote from the lease. 
Paragraph (b)(1) proposes to limit the transportation allowance to 50 percent 
of the value of coal determined pursuant to § 206.259. Paragraph (b)(1) also 
contains a limitation on the amount of total deduction by selling arrangements 
for lessees that qualify for both washing and transportation allowances. As 
stated previously in the discussion of § 206.260(a) (washing allowances), total 
deductions are proposed to be limited to 75 percent of the value of coal 
determined pursuant to § 206.259. The 50 and 75 percent limitations contained in 
paragraph (b)(1) are not absolute. Paragraph (b)(2) provides for the MMS 
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Director to approve an allowance in excess of those limits if the lessee submits 
an application which demonstrates that the higher allowance is warranted and is 
in the best interests of the lessor. 
Paragraph (c) would require that the per ton transportation costs be 
determined based on the full tonnage transported. Therefore, if unwashed coal is 
transported to a wash plant remote from the mine, the transportation cost would 
be determined on the total weight of material transported, including the 
impurities. However, paragraph (c) further provides that MMS will not 
participate in the costs of transporting impurities. 
Paragraph (d) provides for the determination of transportation allowances 
under arm's-length and non-arm's-length or no contract situations, including 
those situations where the lessee performs the transportation service. This 
section is virtually the same as § 206.260(b) (washing allowances). Therefore, 
the preamble discussion for that section applies here. 
Paragraph (e) contains reporting requirements parallel to those provided for 
washing allowances at § 206.260(c). The earlier discussion provided herein with 
regard to washing allowances is equally applicable to this subsection. The same 
applies to §§ 206.262(f) and (g). 
Proposed § 206.263, Contract submission, would provide that lessees must 
submit to MMS, upon request, coal sales contracts, supply agreements, contract 
amendments or any other documents affecting gross proceeds, whether or not 
related to the sales contract. This section would further require the lessee to 
certify, in writing, that all requested information has been provided. If a 
lessee falsely certifies, it will be subject to penalties and other sanctions 
pursuant to applicable laws and regulations. Also, under this section, MMS would 
specify whether the information is to be sent to MMS or made available at the 
lessee's office. 
This section also would require lessees to include, as part of their 
submittal, any other contracts, agreements, or documents that affect the gross 
proceeds accruing to the lessee from the sale of coal. For example, if the 
lessee agrees to sell coal to a utility and, as part of the agreement, the 
utility provides mining equipment at a reduced price, that price reduction is 
part of the consideration for the sale of the coal. As such, the lessee is 
obligated to submit information about the mining equipment agreement as well as 
any other sales-related documents. 
Paragraph (b) would provide that lessees and other payors would be required 
to advise MMS whether the contract is arm's-length or non-arm's-length. A 
definition of arm's-length contract is proposed to be included in § 2 06.2 51. 
This designation is important because, for ad valorem leases, it would determine 
which valuation method would be used. It is not proposed to make this 
designation part of the certification. 
The lessee's designation of a contract as arm's-length would not be 
conclusive. Paragraph (c) provides that MMS may later audit the contract to 
ascertain that the lessee's designation of the contract as arm's-length meets 
the criteria of MMS' arm-length contract definition. 
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